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The motives and economic consequences of accounting conservatism is an 
important research topic of academic circles in China and abroad in recent years. 
Watts (2003) believes contract, tax, regulation and legal proceedings are all motives of 
accounting conservatism. Institutional investors act as shareholders of the company 
and then maintain a contractual relationship with the management, so there comes a 
question whether there is a demand for accounting conservatism from institutional 
investors. The specific nature of institutional investors, the enterprise ownership and 
the growth potential, and the regional economic and legal environment may all 
produce an impact on the behavior of institutional investors (positive behavior or 
negative behavior), thereby affecting the demand of accounting conservatism. 
Meanwhile, accounting conservatism is also an important characteristic of the quality 
of accounting information, so there is a need to think about what impact this would 
lead to on the allocation of resources (such as cost of capital and investment 
efficiency). This article also considers the influence of the dominant features of 
state-owned shares in China's capital market and the background of Share Segregation 
Reform on accounting conservatism. The paper distinguishes the difference between 
state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, and also incorporates the 
time before and after the Share Segregation Reform, thus on this basis analyzes 
whether there are significant divergences  of accounting conservatism on the cost of 
capital and investment efficiency. 
Based on the theoretical analysis, this article employs the empirical data of 
Chinese A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2011 to deeply elaborate the 
above-mentioned questions. The results show that:(1) Institutional investors process 
anti-needs of accounting conservatism, and the “pressure-resist” type of institutional 
investors (such as funds, pension funds and OFII, etc.) have a relatively small 
anti-need compared with the “pressure-sensitive” ones (such as brokerage, trust, 
insurance and bank, etc.). This indirectly proves that the “pressure-resist” institutional 
investors can play some role of supervisory. The article also found that the better the 
growth of the company, the lower the demand of accounting conservatism from 















has an insignificant impact on the relationship between institutional investors and 
accounting conservatism. (2) The result shows that the greater the accounting 
conservatism, the lower the cost of capital. And in those state-owned enterprises, the 
relationship between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital is 
relatively weaker than that with the cost of debt capital. After the Share Segregation 
Reform, the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and the cost of 
debt capital has strengthened and there is no significant change of the relationship 
between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital. (3) Accounting 
conservatism makes an apparent contribution to inhibiting overinvestment; however it 
exacerbated the behavior of underinvestment. The inhibition function of accounting 
conservatism has no difference in state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, but 
the strengthening function on underinvestment is more evident in those 
non-state-owned enterprises compared with state-owned ones. After the Share 
Segregation Reform, the effect of accounting conservatism on overinvestment and 
underinvestment does not have a notable change. But there is a further finding after 
packet inspection: among those overinvestment groups, there is no significant 
relationship between accounting conservatism and investment behavior before the 
Share Segregation Reform and after it, the relationship is found to be significantly 
negative; and among those underinvestment groups, the Share Segregation Reform 
strengthens the relationship between accounting conservatism and investment 
behavior. Furthermore, after the Share Segregation Reform, the problem of 
underinvestment has been relieved but this does not happen to the problem of 
overinvestment. 
This article has the following innovations and improvements: (1) This article 
comprehensively investigates the impact of institutional investors on accounting 
conservatism, and makes a thorough analysis of the behavior of institutional investors 
considering the differences of the nature of institutional investors, the enterprise 
ownership and growth, and the external legal and economic environment. The article 
not only greatly improve the study on influencing factors of accounting conservatism, 
but also makes a new attempt trying to investigate the governance effect of 
institutional investors from the perspective of accounting conservatism. (2) This 
article incorporates the specific characteristics of domestic capital market in the 
investigation of effect of accounting conservatism on the cost of capital and the 
















position of state-owned enterprises and the Share Segregation Reform. Thus, this 
article greatly improves the theoretical study on economic consequences of 
accounting conservatism and makes a reasonable explanation on the certain 
characteristics of resource allocation in domestic capital market. (3) By comparing 
differences of the effect of accounting conservatism on the cost of capital and the 
efficiency of investment after and before the Share Segregation Reform, this article 
indirectly confirms that the critical measure of Share Segregation Reform really 
makes a positive contribution to the capital market. 
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